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6I. Introduction
In several ways, the export promoting strategy adopted by the Singapore government since
the late 1960s can be considered successful. One is the strategy’s contribution to solving the
severe unemployment problem Singapore faced in the early 1960s. The unemployment rate
was around 14 percent—roughly 39,000 people—in 1965. The British military withdrawal in
1968 threatened the country with an additional unemployment pool of 30,000, of which
20,000 were directly employed by the British army and 10,000 were employed in domestic
service and other services related to the military presence. Losing Malaysia as its hinterland
and realizing that import substitution was impossible after gaining independence in 1965,
Singapore embarked on a policy of promoting labor-intensive manufactured exports via the
attraction of foreign investors into the country. The average unemployment rate declined from
7.4 percent in 1966-70 to 1.9 percent in 1991-97. (See Table 1.) Accompanying the steady
decline in unemployment over the past thirty years has been a steady rise in workers’ real
consumption wages and their standards of living, both important measures of development.
The aim of this paper is to try to understand how Singapore was generally successful in its
export promoting strategy. Historically, Singapore experimented with an import-substituting
strategy in the first half of the sixties in anticipation of forming a common market with
Malaysia and also briefly after its independence in 1965. The level of protection, however,
was relatively low during its import-substituting phase. A study by Tan and Ow (1982)
showed that tariff and quota protection covered 21.6 percent of total manufactured output at
world prices in 1967. Tariff rates were generally no higher than 25 percent. The average
effective protection rate for the manufacturing sector was only 6 percent on total sales and 8
percent on domestic sales. To avoid undermining entrepot trade, which had traditionally been
a mainstay of the economy, bonded warehouses were introduced to allow entrepot traders to
store, process, and package imported goods for re-export without being subjected to custom
duties. Duty drawbacks were also given for imported industrial inputs where there were no
domestic sources of supply. The period of import-substitution was short as it quickly became
clear to the government that the small domestic market of about 1.5 million people in the mid-
1960s could not sustain an industrialization program developed behind protective walls. From
the late 1960s onwards, tariffs and quotas were reduced and finally removed on most goods,
making the use of bonded warehouses and duty drawbacks redundant. Our study will
therefore focus only on export processing zones (EPZs).
Traditionally an EPZ refers to a zone within which firms can freely import inputs and
machinery to produce output for export with minimal restrictions and regulations. It is also
usually an industrial estate with or without standard ready-built factory buildings equipped
with special infrastructure not available outside the zone. Industries located within the EPZ
are offered a whole package of export and investment incentives. The entire city-state of
Singapore, and not just a small part of it, however, can be considered an export processing
zone. Traditionally, it has been a free port, a status it has maintained except for the brief
period of import substitution. Industrialization is largely export oriented, and is undertaken by
foreign investors who enjoy restriction-free trade flows, personnel movement, technology
transfers, and international capital movement. Firms that are both within and outside
government industrial estates face minimal bureaucratic red tape, and enjoy a high quality of
support in infrastructure. Being a small country in terms of land size and population that was
facing serious unemployment problem in the early 1960s, Singapore could not afford to
reconfigure a small part of the country as an EPZ. Instead, it involved the whole country in
the implementation of an EPZ.
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Several factors contributed to the success of Singapore’s early efforts to industrialize based
upon the export of labor-intensive manufactures. One example is the political commitment to
openness to trade in both goods and capital. When it was not a popular position, Singapore
adopted a consistently liberal policy towards foreign direct investment. Over time, the
country’s consistency in welcoming foreign investors built for the government strong
credibility as a host country. In a survey conducted by Helen Hughes of 127 firms with direct
capital investment from six principal countries investing in Singapore, it is reported that, “The
main factors which foreign investors claimed attracted them to Singapore were the
government’s welcoming attitude expressed in positive assistance mainly through the
Economic Development Board and other government departments and instrumentalities, and
the efficiency of the public services and utilities. Industrial estates were an added bonus.”
(See Hughes and You, 1969.)
The government’s open policy over the years is reflected in the high exports to GDP ratio and
the high imports to GDP ratio as shown in Table 2, as well as the large foreign share of total
investment in the manufacturing sector as shown in Table 3. In 1996, for example, the exports
to GDP ratio is 1.33, the imports to GDP ratio is 1.40 and the share of foreign net investment
commitments in manufacturing is 71 percent. Under a liberal policy towards international
commerce and foreign capital, the per capita GDP grew at an average rate of 10.4 percent per
annum from 1961 to 1996. This is another measure of success in addition to the drastic
decline in the rate of unemployment shown in Table 1.
What is the rationale behind the government’s liberal policy towards foreign investors? In his
Budget Statement presented to Parliament on March 9, 1970, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, widely
viewed as Singapore’s early economic architect, provided a review of Singapore’s first
decade of development. There he proffered, “We have made long and strenuous efforts to
attract foreign investment into Singapore, but not because we need the money. The high level
of our overseas assets shows that we have more than we can usefully spend in Singapore. We
welcome foreign investors for the two things they bring with them—technology and
markets.” Apart from the available technology and ready markets brought by foreign
investors, there is, in fact, a third benefit that the government sees in attracting foreign
investors to Singapore, namely, that they provide a market signal to the authorities about what
sort of manpower training is needed for industry. Thus Singapore avoids the problem of
producing large numbers of university graduates who cannot find useful employment. These
multinational corporations (MNCs) themselves, of course, provide employment opportunities.
In the early days of industrialization, jobs were created by the MNCs for unskilled and semi-
skilled workers but as the process of industrialization proceeds along, MNCs increasingly
offer middle-level as well as top-level management positions to Singaporeans. In this way,
foreign direct investment facilitates the upward mobility of workers in Singapore. Thus the
readiness of the government to raise the level of human capital in response to the changing
needs of industry is one more factor behind the success of its export promoting drive based on
attracting foreign investment.
Chong (1983) provided some evidence on the transfer of managerial know-how from an
MNC to local personnel. He found that the proportions of local managerial personnel
employed at Esso Singapore had increased at various levels of management from 1970 to
1980. For general (top) management, there was an increase from 0 percent to 75 percent; for
middle management, it was an increase from 55 percent to 75 percent. The lower
management personnel were entirely local for both 1970 and 1980.
Another factor behind Singapore’s ability to attract foreign direct investment, which helped
alleviate the unemployment problem, was the restoration of industrial labor harmony after
massive labor strikes in the early 1960s. In the same Budget Statement, Dr Goh suggested that
8the political in-fighting between the Communist United Front and the People’s Action Party
resulted in a large number of strikes called by the Communist United Front as part of its
attempt to coerce the Government. He cited figures providing the number of man-days lost in
strikes in the early 1960s, rising from 152,006 in 1960 to 388,219 in 1963. The defeat of the
Communist United Front in the Referendum of August 1962, followed by subsequent security
action against them, he argued, restored a measure of industrial peace. Strikes accounted for a
loss of only 35,908 man-days in 1964 and in 1969, the figure was 8,512. Two labor laws
passed in 1968 probably contributed to industrial peace. Firstly, the Employment Act (1968)
standardized the terms and conditions of employment and set limits on negotiable fringe
benefits, including holidays, sick leave, overtime, retrenchment and severance terms, and a
forty-four-hour work week. The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act of 1968 excluded
from collective bargaining such issues as recruitment, retrenchment, promotion, retirement,
transfer, dismissal, and work assignments, placing these matters within management’s
prerogative. In addition, it spelled out new procedures for labor negotiation and conflict
resolution, including compulsory arbitration. Foreign investors must have found the peaceful
labor situation attractive; in turn, the steady inflows of foreign direct investment helped to
reduce unemployment and raise real wages, which helped further to maintain industrial peace.
Table 4 clearly shows the drastic drop in the number of industrial stoppages and man-days
lost. There has been no incidence of industrial stoppages since 1978 except for the year 1986
when Singapore suffered a recession. In fact, the Department of Statistics has stopped
publishing such data since 1992.
Apart from the well-known fact of Singapore’s fiscal prudence, the establishment of key
institutions is another factor behind Singapore’s success. The key institution charged with the
duty of promoting the growth of industries in Singapore is the Economic Development Board
(EDB), which was set up in August 1961. A key aspect underlying the operation of EDB has
been its ability to respond to changes in factor prices brought about by the country’s shifting
comparative advantage. In the next section, we will provide an overview of structural change
within the manufacturing sector from the 1960s to the 1990s. After that, we will describe and
analyze the organization and functions of EDB, packages of incentives offered by EDB to
promote manufactured exports, the composition of firms that are granted pioneer status, loans
and equity participation of EDB, and human resource development of EDB. The analysis
presented here will focus on the responses of EDB to changes in demand and supply
conditions in regional and world markets.
III. Structural Change within Manufacturing
To briefly examine the structural change within manufacturing from the 1960s to the 1990s,
we have extracted principal statistics of some selected industries. The Singapore Standard
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities has been changing over the years as
shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7 for selected industries, thus making comparison over time a
difficult task. To make the comparison over time more consistent, we have grouped the
selected industrial sectors into four categories (A, B, C, and D).
· A is defined to comprise the food and beverage industries;
· B comprises textiles and textile manufactures, and wearing apparel except footwear;
· C comprises paints, pharmaceuticals, chemical products, petroleum refineries, and
petroleum products; and
· D, the largest sector in 1996, includes machinery and equipment, electrical machinery
and apparatus, electronic products and components, precision and optical instruments,
and transport equipment.
As shown in Tables 5 to 7, each selected industry is identified by its sector code together with
a number. For example, food industry is code A1.
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respectively for the period from 1961 to 1996 for the selected manufacturing industries.
Summarizing, Table 11 presents the data for the four industrial sectors A, B, C, and D. Note
that the increase in employment in the manufacturing sector as a whole has been significant,
especially for the period from the 1960s to the 1970s. Aside from 1986, which was a
recession year, sector D (electrical machinery, electronics, etc.) has been a particularly major
contributor in terms of employment gains throughout the years. In contrast, employment in
sector B (textiles, apparels, etc.) increased greatly from the 1960s to the 1970s, but leveled off
somewhat in the 1980s and, in fact, declined in the mid-90s. The output and wages follow
similar patterns as employment. Table 12 shows the shares of employment, output, and wages
by selected industrial sector. Sector D has been increasing over time in terms of shares of
employment, output, and wages while sector B’s shares increased in the 1960s and 1970s but
decreased in the 1980s and 1990s. The increasing relative importance of industrial sector D
and the relative decline of industrial sector B reflect the shifting comparative advantage of the
Singapore economy. As physical and human capital increased relative to the endowment of
unskilled labor, a process of industrial restructuring occurred with the more labor-intensive
sectors becoming less competitive and being supplanted by the more capital-intensive sectors.
Table 13 shows the output and wage per worker by selected industrial sector. Reflecting the
more capital-intensive nature of production in sectors C (chemical products, petroleum
products, etc.) and D (electrical machinery, electronics, etc.), the wage per worker in these
sectors is higher than that in sector B (textiles, apparels, etc.). From Table 13, we can
compute that from 1961 to 1996, output per worker and wage per worker in total
manufacturing grew on average at 8.4 percent and 7.3 percent per annum respectively. Output
per worker in sectors A, B, C, and D grew at 6.5 percent, 7.1 percent, 12.7 percent, and 9.2
percent per annum respectively. The figures for the growth rates of wages per worker are 7.3
percent, 7.2 percent, 9.3 percent, and 6.4 percent respectively. Although the wage per worker
in sector B has been below the manufacturing sector’s average, it has nevertheless been
increasing over the years. This is partly a reflection of the shift towards higher value-added
lines of garment production (producing fashionable high-end garments rather than standard
wear) and the increase in mechanization in the textiles and garments industry. A textiles and
garment industry training center was set up by the government in the early 1980s to train
garment workers in the use of more sophisticated equipment in garment production. Notice
also that the output per worker has been increasing faster than the wage per worker in sector
D, reflecting the increasing relative importance of intermediates and capital costs in the
electronics sector.
In summary, the Singapore economy from 1961 to 1996 exhibited major structural change in
the manufacturing sector. With the economy becoming relatively more capital-abundant, the
relative importance of textiles and wearing apparel has declined while machinery and
equipment, electrical and electronic products, precision and optical instruments, and transport
equipment have gained a greater share of employment and output in total manufacturing. The
change in the structure of relative factor endowments of the economy brings about a shift in
its comparative advantage. Consequently, the kinds of products that Singapore can sell in the
world market must change to reflect its shifting comparative advantage. The policy responses
from the Economic Development Board, as we will see, reflect these changes.
IV. The Key Institution: Economic Development Board
Economic Development Board was the main institution involved in the export promotion of
Singapore. A key measure of success of EDB in solving the unemployment problem through
promotion of labor-intensive manufactured exports is the rapid and steady decline in
unemployment. By the late 1970s, Singapore registered negligible unemployment. Another
key measure of success of EDB is the persistently high rate of return of foreign equity
investment in Singapore. This can be taken as a proxy for the satisfaction of the clients of
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EDB. From Table 14, we can see that the returns on foreign equity investment in
manufacturing are consistently higher than the returns on local equity investment by around
10 percent for the years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1994.
A third measure of success is the continual increase in exports of Singapore both in terms of
quantity and quality. This is an important measure because the neighboring countries and
other Newly Industrializing Countries are competing keenly with Singapore and an indicator
of success will be its ability to move towards higher value-added products in the export of
Singapore. From the analysis presented in the previous section, we know that the
manufacturing sector of Singapore is undergoing a transformation to a more capital-intensive
mode of production. Most of these higher value-added products produced here are exported to
the rest of the world.
What are the keys to the success of EDB? Firstly, it was given a substantially larger working
capital of S$ 100 million to start with in August 1961, replacing the Singapore Industrial
Promotion Board which was formed in 1957 and had a meager working capital of S$ 1
million. The programs of the Singapore Industrial Promotion Board were not successful, only
in part because of the small size of its working capital.
Secondly, EDB was successful because it responded quickly to changes in market forces. This
is linked to the fast responses of government policies to changes in market forces and changes
in the comparative advantage position of Singapore. This is illustrated by the change in a
strategy of import substitution to a strategy of export promotion via foreign investment after
independence in 1965 as well as the "begetting" of  the Development Bank of Singapore,
Jurong Town Corporation, Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, National
Productivity Board, and Singapore Institute of Management. Thirdly, EDB maintained
consistent policies, followed through the incentives as promised, and was clean without
corruption. Fourthly, EDB was able to solve problems encountered by its clients efficiently.
Related to this is the network building of EDB with its clients and other government agencies.
Fifthly, EDB has contributed to the development of human resources necessary for the
industrialization of Singapore, and in particular, to meet the needs of investors.
Structure of EDB
EDB was formed on August 1, 1961, with the primary function of promoting the
establishment of new industries in Singapore and to accelerate the growth of existing ones.
The first board members of EDB were Hon Sui Sen (chairman), Lim Kim San (deputy
chairman of EDB, and chairman of housing development), Lien Ying Chow (banking), Lim
Chew Swee (manufacturing), Rumme Shaw (commerce), G. Kandasamy (labor), and F.C.
Yap (professional and academic). The board members were well-known figures from
different sectors of the Singapore economy. Their expertise and the networks in their
respective circles could be tapped to insure efficient operation of the organization.
There was a flexible wage system within EDB, with wages adjusting to market conditions: 35
percent variable allowance for the senior employees and 30 percent variable allowance for
junior employees. Many of its top officers were seconded from other government departments
and agencies. Many of them held positions in several departments and government agencies.
This represents a quick inflow of human capital into the organization as well as a quick and
deliberate establishment of network within the organization and between the organization and
external agencies with whom EDB needed to work.
There were five divisions in EDB when it was first established: Promotion Division, Finance
Division, Projects Division, and Technical Consultant Service, and Industrial Facilities
Division. The Promotion Division concentrated on building linkages with industries through
various associations as well as at firm levels. It distributed information regarding
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opportunities of investment, government policies, and incentives. It also hunted for potential
investors and introduced them to the Finance Division.
The Finance Division conducted personal and subjective screening of clients led by the
Promotion Division. It was also in charge of the disbursement of loans and equity investment.
In August 1968, its functions were taken over by the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS).
After the initial screening of clients who were deemed suitable for programs of EDB, the
Finance Department would then refer these clients to the Projects Division.
Projects Division and Technical Consultant Service conducted objective and economic
evaluation of clients referred by the Finance Division. They provided technical assistance to
the businessmen, conducted training courses, and coordinated with tertiary educational
institutes and the United Nations in the training of manpower for industry.
The Industrial Facilities Division leased contracts to build roads, railway, and bridges, to fill
ponds, and to develop other infrastructure in Jurong. It coordinated with various government
agencies in the development of Jurong Town. Through the networking, rapport was built
among the officials from different government agencies. The Industrial Facilities Division
greatly reduced the transaction costs of businessmen in dealing with other government
departments. This division became bigger and eventually was separated to become the Jurong
Town Corporation (JTC) in 1968.
We have briefly described the various roles of the divisions of EDB. Over time, the structure
of EDB has changed as some divisions or sections spring off as new organizations by
themselves: DBS, JTC, National Productivity Board, and Singapore Institute of Standards and
Industrial Research. Similarly, new divisions are added and old ones are eliminated or
consolidated in tandem with market needs. In the earlier years, the notion of a “one-stop”
business center of EDB was a helpful one in attracting foreign investors. The role played by
EDB was one of a coordinator who reduced the transaction costs of foreign investors who
were not familiar with the operations of the various government agencies in Singapore. Over
the years as the operations of EDB became more complicated and high in volume, there was a
need to specialize in the tasks it could do best, which seemed to be promotion at that point in
time.
DBS took over EDB’s function of providing finance to the industry in 1968. The listing of
DBS in the stock market also subjected itself to the testing of its performance in the market.
JTC took over the function of the Industrial Facilities Division in 1968, focusing on the
industrial estate in Jurong. Later it also managed other industrial estates in other parts of
Singapore. Its functions also included the building and management of public housing in the
industrial estates. There was a need for workers in the industrial estate to reside near their
work places and the provision of public housing by JTC met the demand by the market.
By 1996, the organizational structure of EDB had evolved into a borderless network
providing total client servicing. The board members, the International Advisory Council, and
EDB committees provide strategic direction, external inputs, and advice. Currently, out of a
total of nine members of the International Advisory Council, which was formed in 1995, six
are CEOs of MNCs. They provide an important source of linkage of EDB to the dynamic
international marketplace in terms of contributions to EDB’s evolving economic strategies
and feedback on EDB’s international investment promotion strategies and operations. The
management sets directions, policies, and strategies while the various corporate departments
(Planning, Human Resources, Corporate Services, Information Management, and Corporate
Audit) provide core organizational services and information.
EDB’s main work focus is reflected and implemented by its corporate programs (Innovation,
Manufacturing, International Business Hub, Promising Local Enterprises, Regionalization,
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Co-Investment, Learning Organization), business functions (Industry Development, Services
Development, Enterprise Development, Economic Resource Development, EDB Investment
Private Limited, EDB Consulting Group), and country programs (International Operations,
International Business Development). The highlighting of various programs in its
organizational structure signifies the task-oriented and pro-business approach of EDB.
Officers and managers of EDB are usually interlocked in different programs and departments,
creating a networked and borderless culture. EDB currently has fourteen international offices:
three in North America, five in Europe, and six in Asia.
Now we will briefly state the objectives of the eight major programs of EDB. Under the
Innovation program, the Innovation Strategic Business Unit was set up in 1996 with a budget
of S$ 500 million to encourage Singapore-registered companies to implement innovation
projects. Innovation Development Scheme grants amounting to S$ 217 million have been
awarded as of July 1997. The Manufacturing program aims to maintain manufacturing as a
strong economic pillar, contributing at least 25 percent of GDP and 20 percent of employment
in the medium to long term. Out of a total of S$ 8.09 billion fixed assets investments in
manufacturing in 1996, S$ 5.72 billion came from foreign investors. The International
Business Hub program wants to promote Singapore as the Asia-Pacific gateway linking the
region to the world. It complements the Manufacturing program by developing total business
capabilities in various clusters in Singapore: regional headquarters, logistics, communications
and media, education, and healthcare. Total business spending amounted to S$ 1.46 billion in
1996 of which S$ 906 million came from foreign investors. The Regionalization program was
launched in 1992 to enhance Singapore’s competitiveness by linking the domestic economy
to an external economy, and by strengthening Singapore’s allure to both MNCs and local
companies investing in the region. The Promising Local Enterprises (PLE) program was
introduced in 1995 to nurture strong local enterprises so that they could become Asian MNCs.
EDB helps the PLEs to develop new capabilities, identifies and facilitates strategic alliances,
and provides growth capital to them. The Co-Investment program fortifies Singapore’s risk-
sharing joint ventures with MNCs and PLEs in the region, filling up critical gaps in various
industrial clusters, strengthening ties with the region, and accelerating growth of PLEs.
Wholly owned by EDB, EDB Investment Pte Ltd is the investment arm, managing over S$ 2
billion via various funds. Under the Economic Resource Development program, EDB
analyzes emerging business trends, and develops and optimizes resources such as manpower,
housing, land, and utilities to meet such trends. An example is the development of Jurong
Island, where seven surrounding islands were amalgamated to form 3,000 hectares of land for
the petrochemicals industry. Another is the development of the Wafer Fab parks for the
infrastructure needs of the wafer fabrication industry. Under the Economic Resource
Development program, the Specialist Manpower Program and the International Manpower
Program facilitate the education and recruitment of technical specialists, and the recruitment
and entry of international professionals into Singapore respectively. The Learning
Organization program aims to strengthen EDB’s teamwork and cohesive corporate culture.
EDB continues to specialize in the promotion of investment in Singapore, an activity it has
excelled in. Since the late 1980s, EDB has expanded the promotion of domestic investment to
regional investment, providing expertise in coordination and problem solving among
government agencies to MNCs, which reduces their transaction costs in investment. This is a
response to changing comparative advantage of the Singapore economy as the labor cost of
Singapore increases relative to the neighboring countries. EDB has also paid more attention to
nurturing local enterprises through various programs. Promotion of investment in the service
sector has also gained momentum as services gain prominence in the Singapore economy.
Tax Incentives Administered by EDB
The Pioneer Industries Ordinance and the Industrial Expansion Ordinance were introduced in
1959 to promote new investments and expansions in industries and products considered
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“essential” to the economy. One of the many functions of EDB, since it was formed in 1961,
was to process applications of firms for pioneer and expansion status. Designated pioneer
enterprises were given a five-year exemption from the 40 percent corporate income tax.
Designated expansion enterprises were given tax concessions ranging from 11 to 15 percent
for a period of three to five years, according to the magnitudes of their investment outlays.
Both the pioneer and expansion incentives were amended in 1967 under the Economic
Expansion Incentives Act to encourage investments of larger scales. The 1970 Amendments
tightened the eligibility criteria for pioneer and expansion status: a minimum of S$ 1 million
investment was required of a pioneer enterprise and at least an additional investment of S$ 10
million for an expansion enterprise. The 1975 Amendments allowed an extension of the
pioneer status up to 10 years for skill-intensive and technology-intensive industries. The
minimum investment requirement was removed to encourage the formation of supporting
industries. Several new tax incentives were introduced in 1979-80 to encourage economic
restructuring in manufacturing and other industries. An investment allowance, up to 50
percent tax deduction of new fixed investment, was used to encourage upgrading and
mechanization of existing operations. Research and development (R & D) was also
encouraged in terms of a double deduction of R & D expenditures excluding building and
equipment, an accelerated depreciation over three years for all plant and machinery for R &
D, an investment allowance of up to 50 percent of the capital investment in R & D, excluding
items like the cost of buildings.
The package of incentives has changed over time in response to the changing market
conditions. As Singapore faces stiffer competition from neighboring countries with cheaper
labor, and as Singapore’s comparative advantage shifts towards more skill-intensive
industries, thus the package of incentives offered by EDB has been changed to provide the
necessary attractions to foreign investors. The focus has been directed to promotion of higher
value-added manufactures, promotion of service industries that are knowledge-intensive,
promotion of regional investment and regional headquarters, and encouragement of local
companies to expand and venture overseas.
A current list of tax incentives under the Economic Expansion Incentive (Relief from Income
Tax) Act and another current list of tax incentives under the Income Tax Act are given in the
appendix. Both lists are extracted from CCH (1997). Many of these incentives are
administered by EDB. We shall now describe some of them here, especially those which were
introduced in the 1990s.
Firms granted the status of pioneer enterprise enjoy tax exemption on qualifying profits for a
period of five to ten years, depending on product type, investment level, skills, gestation
period, and technology. Service companies—such as companies in engineering and technical
services, computer-based information and other computer related services, development or
production of industrial design, trading in art and antiques by auction houses, and operation of
private museum—which are awarded pioneer status similarly enjoy tax exemption on
qualifying profits for five to ten years with provision for extension. Exporters of services—
such as technical and engineering services, consultancy and advisory services, data processing
and programming, accounting and legal services, education and training—with minimum
exports level of 20 percent of total revenue may qualify for a low 2.6 percent tax on
qualifying export income for up to ten years with provision for extension.
Companies providing international consultancy services in connection with an approved
overseas project with an expected annual revenue exceeding S$ 1 million enjoy a 50 percent
exemption of tax on qualifying profits for a period of five years. Operational headquarters
which are set up in Singapore to provide management and treasury services to related and
associated companies outside Singapore enjoy as low as 10 percent tax on income arising
from such approved services for up to ten years. Business headquarters providing business,
professional, and key support services to other companies in the region may enjoy any of the
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tax incentives under the Economic Expansion Incentive Act. These incentives help to promote
Singapore as the regional business hub.
A Singapore-incorporated and Singapore-resident holding company which is at least 50
percent owned by Singaporean may claim losses and capital allowances for its investment in
new technology companies during the first three years of its investment. The amount
available is equal to the approved percentage of equity invested up to 50 percent and has to
been claimed within five years after expiry of a qualifying period. With similar qualifications
as the incentive for investment in new technology companies, an approved overseas enterprise
which invests in approved overseas investments and projects is granted a tax exemption on
qualifying income and a portion of domestic income connected to approved investments and
projects for up to ten years. Both incentives encourage local firms to venture overseas and to
invest in new technology.
Structural Change of Pioneer Manufacturers
Aggregate statistics on pioneer manufacturing establishments relative to all manufacturing
establishments over the years reveal the changing selection and composition of pioneer firms
by EDB in response to changes in market conditions. In the earlier years, the share of
employment by pioneer firms out of total employment by all manufacturing establishments
increased drastically, from 0.9 percent in 1961 to 47.0 percent in 1971. (See Table 15.) This
reflects the efforts by EDB to solve the unemployment problem in the 1960s by encouraging
investments in pioneer firms that, once started, would create new job opportunities. The share
of employment dropped by a few percentage points in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and
increased to 46.7 percent in 1996. Guided by the amended tax incentives introduced in the
1975 Amendments and other incentives introduced later, EDB has since focused on the
promotion of investment in skill-intensive and technology-intensive industries. With the
unemployment rate below 4 percent in the late 1970s and facing cheap unskilled labor
supplies in neighboring countries, which began to attract foreign investors, especially in the
mid- to late 1980s, Singapore had to develop and take advantage of its comparative advantage
in skill-intensive and technology-intensive industries. A long-term strategy of EDB is to
encourage investments in new industries by foreign investors with ready technology. The
rising share of output by pioneer manufacturing firms out of all manufacturing establishments
from 7.0 percent in 1961 to 69.0 percent in 1996, and the increase in value-added per worker
in the pioneer manufacturing firms, reflects this underlying strategy.
Information Flow and Interaction with Industry
EDB keeps a close relationship with the industry in various ways. It has offices around the
world where its officers gather information and interact with corporations in the countries
which may be interested in establishing industries in Singapore. The information gathered by
these field officers is transmitted quickly back to the home base in Singapore in a database
which all officers of EDB can access immediately. The home base staff also disseminates
relevant information to the overseas offices regularly. The information flow of EDB is fast
and efficient.
Another peculiar organizational structure of EDB is the building of teams for projects where
members of a team are likely to be from different departments of EDB. This helps to build
rapport between officers from different departments as well as giving the officers a sense of
the overall picture of a project from the viewpoint of EDB instead of from the limited
viewpoint of a single department. An officer may be in several teams and involved in a few
projects. This form of multitasking of the officers helps to raise the quality of human capital
in the organization.
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To encourage interactions with industry, junior officers are asked to accompany the senior
officers to meetings with the CEOs of MNCs. Another channel through which EDB interacts
with the industry is via “think-tank breakfasts” held at nice hotels. At each breakfast,
approximately twelve industrial guests (with no conflicting interests) and four to six EDB
people are invited. The purpose of such meetings is to discuss current interests of the industry,
to get feedback on proposals of EDB, and to encourage industrial people to think about
Singapore in a helpful way. EDB builds a network and exchanges information through such
gatherings.
Loans and Equity Participation of EDB
Have been granted a substantial amount of working capital, EDB and its Finance Division
was able to invest in and provide loans to firms that were considered to potentially contribute
growth to the Singapore economy. In the first year of the operation of EDB, it invested in the
National Iron and Steel Mills and had the right to appoint two directors to its board. It also
financed development works in the Jurong Industrial Project Scheme.
Table 16 shows the loans and equity participation of EDB from 1961 to 1968. We see that the
loans disbursed by EDB increased from a mere S$ 0.1 million in 1961 to S$ 17 million in
1965. The cumulative loans disbursed between 1961 and 1968 was over S$ 66 million.
Similarly, the amount paid for equity participation increased from S$ 0.1 million in 1961 to
S$ 6 million in 1965. The cumulative amount paid for equity participation from 1961 to 1968
was S$ 28 million. The total amount of cumulative loans disbursed and cumulative amount
paid for equity participation till 1968 was S$ 94 million. This was a huge amount relative to
size of the economy at that time. The Development Bank of Singapore, which was formed on
August 1, 1968, took over the functions of the Finance Division. Table 17 shows the
industrial distribution of DBS-assisted companies and financial commitments for the years
1968 to 1973, and 1976.
From Table 17, we see that in the earlier years, textiles, wood and paper products, and
electrical machinery and electronic products—all relatively labor-intensive industries in those
years—together commanded a large share of the financial commitments of DBS. It was 30.1
percent in 1969. The share commanded by petroleum and petroleum refined product firms
was 22.3 percent in 1969. Over the years, the industrial distribution of financial commitments
have shifted towards more capital-intensive industries. For example, in 1976, financial
institutions commanded a share of 11.1 percent while transport equipment, transport, and
transport-related services together commanded a share of 40.5 percent. In contrast, textiles,
wood and paper products, and electrical machinery and electronic products together
commanded a share of only 10.0 percent. This also reflects the fact that DBS has focused its
financial commitments in infrastructure such as transportation development.
By the end of the 1970s, DBS became a full commercial bank, expanding its local branch
network, opening overseas offices in major international financial centers, and providing
innovative financing packages. DBS is now a local leader in investment banking and treasury
operations. Eleven Initial Public Offers out of the 36 companies listed on the Stock Exchange
of Singapore in 1997 were lead-managed by DBS. As it aspired to be a regional bank, DBS
built strategic partnerships and alliances with regional banks so as to capitalize on the
opportunities that arise when the regional economies recover and grow. In terms of corporate
banking, DBS continues to be a major financier. In the 1990s, it is clear that in terms of
industrial distribution of DBS Group’s loans and advances, manufacturing, building and
construction, financial institutions and holding companies, and professionals and private
individuals constitute more than a share of 70 percent. Table 18 gives the industrial
breakdown from 1993 to 1997.
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DBS is listed in the Stock Exchange of Singapore and competes with other commercial banks
for business. Its prime lending rate is the same as the other major banks in Singapore.
Sometimes DBS leads the other banks in changing the prime rate and at other times, it is a
follower. DBS has grown from a development bank financing economic development to one
competing in the international marketplace.
Besides administering many tax incentives, EDB also provides financing directly to
enterprises under various loan programs, Industrial Development Initiatives, and Enterprise
Development Initiatives. The fund for these programs comes from the Economic
Development Assistance Fund which, in 1997, stands at S$ 1.57 billion. As at March 31,
1997, yet-to-be withdrawn loan commitments for loan programs amounted to approximately
S$ 1.59 billion. Approved and not yet disbursed grants amounted to approximately S$ 484
million. Table 19 shows the amount of loans made under the various loan programs for 1996
and 1997.
The Local Enterprise Finance Scheme provides low-cost fixed rate loans for small- and
medium-sized local enterprises to upgrade and expand their operations. Loans are repayable
over a period not to exceed ten years, and are disbursed through Participating Financial
Institutions, which bear a portion of the credit risk. This scheme was transferred to the
Singapore Productivity and Standards Board and became effective on April 1, 1996. With
similar repayment terms and credit risk sharing arrangements as the Local Enterprise Finance
Scheme, the Regionalization Finance Scheme helps local enterprises to set up operations
overseas. The Capital Assistance Scheme was established in 1975 with a budget of S$ 100
million. It provides long-term financing to companies with skill-intensive and technologically
desirable projects. The Automation Leasing Scheme provides low-cost financing for
companies to automate their operations. Such loans are disbursed through Participating
Financial Institutions who bear 50 percent of the credit risk. The Entrepreneur Development
Fund provides low-cost fixed rate loans for local entrepreneurs to obtain a stake in regional
enterprises. Such loans are repayable over a period not exceeding ten years.
Under the Industrial Development Initiative, incentives are provided to encourage investment
and manpower development in the application of new technology, and for design and
development of new products, processes, and services so as to establish new capabilities
within companies or industries. Local enterprises are provided with incentives under the
Enterprise Development Initiative to modernize and upgrade their operations as well as to
develop new businesses and markets.
We see that these loans and initiatives encourage upgrading of production technology,
regionalization, and local entrepreneurship. Another feature of these loans is the risk sharing
of other financial institutions. Many of these loans are long-term, similar to the long-term
nature of many tax incentives administered by EDB.
Human Resource Development
A Five-Year Plan in education was introduced when Singapore attained self-government in
1959. The plan placed emphasis on the study of mathematics, science and technical subjects
as well as equal treatment for the four streams of education: Malay, Chinese, Tamil, and
English. A technical bias was brought into the school curriculum upon the recommendation of
the 1961 Chan Chieu Kiat Commission of Inquiry into Vocational and Technical Education.
From the start, it was recognized that a well-educated and equipped workforce was required
to meet the needs of the industrialization of Singapore. In 1968, the Technical Education
Department within the Ministry of Education was established to develop technical education
in Singapore. While the Technical Education Department worked in the realm of general
education for school children, EDB was more directly involved in the training of workers
catered to the specific needs of the industries with which EDB had close contacts.
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When the British planned to withdraw its naval base in 1968, a crash program was introduced
to re-train clerks and other workers who would be unemployed upon the military withdrawal.
Courses in turning and fitting, sheet metal work, plumbing, radio maintenance, and repairs
were offered. A total of 1,749 attended seven sessions at elementary level. Out of those
trainees who completed the elementary courses, a total of 295 attended two more sessions of
upgrading training programs.
EDB had attracted technical and financial assistance from a number of foreign governments
and the United Nations Development Programme in establishing six training centers by 1968.
These centers trained workers by producing articles or components needed by the industry.
But sales were restricted and hence reduced the value of this approach. Furthermore,
management of these training and production centers was difficult as each was constrained by
“rules” set by its respective donors. The Engineering Industry Development Agency (EIDA)
was set up by EDB in April 1968 to supervise and control these centers. However, EIDA was
inefficient. A total of 86 trained personnel graduated between 1968 and 1972 at a cost of
around S$ 140,000 per trainee. To remove the strain on government subsidy, EIDA was
converted to a business enterprise responsible for its own financial survival on July 1, 1973.
In 1970, there was a shortage of welders due to the increased demand of the rapidly
expanding ship-repairing industry, as well as the construction of new oil refineries and the
expansion of existing refineries. To cope with this crisis, facilities at the Technical Education
Department were fully utilized for specific courses to train welders. Between 1970 and 1973,
a total of 1,789 welders were trained in this crash program, which successfully met the
industrial need.
From the experience of the crash program described above, EDB saw the need to further train
workers in preparation for anticipated needs of various industries. But it is the industry that
best understands the demands that may develop. The establishment of Tata-Government
Training Center (TGTC) clearly illustrates this fact. The subsidiary of the Tata Group was the
largest engineering firm in India manufacturing among other things trucks, locomotives,
excavators, and machine tools. When it explored the possibility of promoting a precision
engineering industry in Singapore, the group concluded that it was first necessary to have a
training center like its own training schools in India. The discussions between EDB and the
Tata Group resulted in TGTC, the first joint venture training program established with a
successful MNC. The training center produced skilled tool-makers who were demanded by
high precision engineering projects, including those of Tata Precision Industries Pte Ltd, a
Singapore subsidiary of the Tata Group. The Singapore government provided land and
building for the center, an estimated S$ 1.5 million for the purchase of machinery and
equipment required by the center, and for 70 percent of its operating cost. Tata provided 30
percent of the operating costs, including the salaries and expenses of Tata instructors
seconded to the center. Tata was required to train twice the number of skilled workers
required for Tata precision engineering complex. The extra workers trained by Tata were to
be released to the industry through EDB.
Trainees were provided stipends (which increased in stages) while pursuing industrial training
at TGTC. Trainees were required to sign a bond to serve the government or as directed by the
government through EDB with Tata or other companies for a period of five years after
completing their courses.
Other joint training centers were established later, including the Rollei-Government Training
Center in July 1973, and the Philips-Government Training center in 1975. The Rollei-
Government Training Center was renamed Brown Boveri-Government Training center when
Rollei-Werke, the parent company of Rollei Singapore, failed in Germany, and when a Swiss
firm Brown Boveri & Cie joined in partnership with EDB in 1982. In October 1988, the
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Brown Boveri-Government Training Center was transformed to the Precision Engineering
Institute with the absorption of TGTC, signifying the beginning of a multiple-partnership
approach. Later, several firms participated in cooperative projects with the Precision
Engineering Institute.
The close relationship between EDB and the industry helped in a quick response of training
courses to meet changing industrial trends. Courses can be updated and modified rapidly,
unlike the case with institutions within the formal education and vocational training system.
The total enrollment of EDB’s training centers as August 31, 1991, was 1,024 workers, the
annual output was 508 graduates, and the cumulative output was 7,298 graduates. For more
on this topic, see Table 7.3 on page 251 of Soon (1993).
Interested in establishing a joint training center, the Vocational Training Bureau of Japan
contacted EDB and submitted a proposal to their Ministry of Finance. But it was rejected.
With a suggestion from the Vocational Training Bureau, EDB submitted a proposal to the
Government of Japan through the Japan International Cooperation Agency in April 1977.
This proposal argued that not only would a training center alleviate the projected skills
imbalance in electronics, electrical, instrumentation, and mechanical areas, but that a mutual
cooperation between two countries would have considerable impact on public relations. It
would create favorable publicity for Japanese investment, and would assure Japanese
investors that skilled labor required would be made available. The Japan-Singapore
Government Training Center started courses in 1979 and was upgraded to a technical institute
in 1983, the Japan-Singapore Technical Institute.
EDB proposed in 1979 to establish institutes of technology, which would accept trainees with
A-level qualifications, which are equivalent to college entrance examinations, instead of the
O-level qualifications that are comparable to high school leaving examinations. They would
be established with technical and financial assistance from foreign governments, and would
be tied closely to technology leaders from industry. The courses would be more intensive than
those offered by polytechnics or the university engineering degree courses, and would focus
on the practical aspect instead of the theoretical and academic aspects. Merit scholarships,
bursaries, and study loans would be made available to trainees. The award winners would be
bonded for a period of three to five years. Apart from the Japan-Singapore Technical Institute
in 1983, the German-Singapore Institute commenced operations in February 1982 and the
French-Singapore Institute in August 1983. The total enrollment of EDB’s institutes of
technology as at August 31, 1991 was 2,425 workers, the annual output was 990 graduates,
and the cumulative output was 3,765 graduates. See Table 7.4 on page 259 of Soon (1993).
Because of its close relationship with industry, EDB can either determine independently or
request industry data in order to appraise efficiently the manpower needs of the industry, and
respond accordingly. EDB is also capable of tapping into the expertise of the industry through
joint training centers with MNCs, as well as with foreign governments. From the failure of
EIDA, a critical lesson EDB learned is to let the industry contribute to management expertise
and the training of personnel. EDB concentrates on its areas of strength, such as coordination,
building of infrastructure, providing scholarship to the trainees, and retaining the services of
the trainees. EDB has not tried to compete with the formal education system but to
complement it by a more flexible and industry-sensitive curriculum.
V. Overview of Selected Industries and Interview of Firms
We now turn to provide an overview of selected industries in manufacturing in terms of cost
structure and extent of export orientation. Table 20 shows the principal statistics of
manufacturing in 1996. Manufacturers that are wholly and majority foreign-owned contribute
to a larger share of total output, employment, and exports than local manufacturers. In the
manufacturing sector as a whole, materials contribute to a very large share of the total cost,
19
making up nearly 74 percent; remuneration makes up nearly 11 percent and other operating
costs slightly over 15 percent. Direct exports make up nearly 61 percent of total
manufacturing sales. In fact, the share of total sales by wholly foreign-owned manufacturers
going into direct exports is even higher, at over 69 percent in 1996.
Table 21 shows the principal statistics of selected industries in manufacturing. These include
Refined Petroleum Products (code 23), Chemicals & Chemical Products (code 24) (which
consists of Petrochemicals & Petrochemical Products, Pharmaceutical Products, Other
Chemicals & Chemical Products), Machinery & Equipment (code 29), Electronic Products &
Components (code 31), and Transport Equipment (code 33). From Table 21, we see that
Refined Petroleum Products is highly capital-intensive and material-intensive. In fact, its
share of material cost is 90.8 percent of the total costs. Direct exports constitute 33.9 percent
of total sales. Chemicals & Chemical Products is an industry being promoted by EDB. Its
share of material cost is 68.4 percent of the total costs. Remuneration constitutes a share of
13.2 percent and other operating costs, 18.3 percent. Out of its total sales, 74.5 percent is
direct exports. The shares of material costs, remuneration, and other operating costs in total
cost of the Machinery & Equipment industry are 54.2 percent, 20.1 percent, and 25.7 percent,
respectively. Its direct exports constitute a share of 55.9 percent in total sales. Electronic
Products & Components is one of the most important export-oriented industries in
manufacturing. Its share of direct exports in total sales is 77.1 percent. The breakdown of its
costs follows: 81.9 percent is material cost, 6.8 percent is remuneration, and 11.3 percent is
operating cost. For Transport Equipment, 50.6 percent of its total sales is direct export. The
shares of material cost, remuneration, and other operating costs are 31.8 percent, 26.9 percent,
and 41.4 percent, respectively.
The dominance of intermediate inputs in total cost in the key industries in manufacturing is
borne out in the survey of three firms we interviewed. In one wholly foreign-owned firm that
hired 1,750 employees to produce cathode ray tubes, intermediate inputs make up over 60
percent of total cost. Nine percent of total cost goes to cover transportation. Out of total
transportation cost, port costs are a mere 1 percent and international shipping costs make up
45 percent. Its three largest foreign markets make up 55 percent of its total sales and container
trucks are used to deliver the product. Another wholly-foreign owned firm that we
interviewed hires 120 workers and produces oil and gas process and production skid
packages, gas compression packages, and pressure vessels for the oil, gas, and petrochemical
industries. Intermediate inputs make up nearly 60 percent of total costs and transportation
amounts to 10 percent of total costs. Sea shipment is the main form of transportation to its
two main foreign markets, which is responsible for half of its total sales. Both firms cite the
provision of good infrastructure as being a very important consideration in the decision to
locate production in Singapore. The third firm we interviewed is a local firm that hires 800
workers, which began operation in 1991. It produces printers and assembles computer related
printer circuit boards. Intermediate inputs make up 90 percent of its total costs and it relies on
ocean freight to deliver its products to foreign markets. Given the importance of shipping as a
component of total cost, it is useful to provide some facts about the port in Singapore.
The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) was formed in April 1964 to handle primarily break-
bulk cargoes for manufacturers and traders. With foresight in the late 1960s, it planned for a
container terminal, and in 1972, Singapore became the first port in Southeast Asia to have a
purpose-built container handling facility. By the late 1980s, PSA became the world leader in
container terminal operations and has maintained leadership since then. PSA has also
pioneered the hub-and-spoke concept of container shipping in the region, creating a dense
network of main-haul and feeder shipping connections found nowhere else in the world. With
powerful operating systems and advanced IT processes, PSA provides world-class port
services. For example, an average of 88 containers an hour can be handled for third
generation container vessels, or 229 containers an hour on one of the largest container vessels.
PSA can turn around a ship which requires 2,000 container “moves”—to load or unload—in
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less than 10 hours. PSA also boasts a wide network of connections to 600 ports in 130
countries. In summary, PSA has provided the efficient and reliable infrastructure required for
the needs of trade and thus has encouraged foreign investment.
It should be pointed out that it is not only an efficient port that is an important component of
good infrastructure. All three of the firms we interviewed indicate that the existence of
domestic suppliers is an important consideration in the decision to locate in Singapore. In one
firm, 80 percent of the intermediate inputs come from domestic suppliers; in the other two,
the corresponding percentages are 60 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Because road
transportation is used for delivery of intermediate inputs, the government provision of good
roads and relatively easy flow of traffic provide further incentive for firms to bring their
business to Singapore.
As Singapore enters the 21st century, two industrial clusters have been specifically picked by
EDB for further development: the chemical industry (C2000) and the electronics industry
(E2000). These two programs, along with other strategies of EDB, are described in a book
published by EDB entitled Singapore Unlimited. The key sectors in the chemical cluster are
petroleum; petrochemicals; specialty and industrial chemicals; pharmaceutical and healthcare
products and materials; and non-metallic materials. To support partners in the chemical
cluster, Singapore invests in infrastructure development as in the S$ 6 billion project of
Jurong Island Chemical Complex. Many joint R & D programs with MNCs are funded. The
Local Industry Upgrading Program (LIUP), tailored courses at various Institutes of Education,
and the International Manpower Program (IMP) are examples of manpower and capability
development. Under LIUP, six large petrol and petrochemical companies have developed and
strengthened the cooperation within the group, so as to upgrade the capabilities of their
subcontractors in engineering and maintenance services. Under IMP, overseas offices of EDB
have been attracting people with critical skills and facilitate the immigration of successful
candidates. MNCs are encouraged to set up their operational headquarters in Singapore to
coordinate and manage the activities of their subsidiaries in the region. Environmental care is
not ignored. The Singapore Chemical Industry Council, which is comprised of the world’s
leading chemical companies, is committed to the safety and health of the general public and
to the conservation of the environment. For example, the East Asia Response Private Limited
was set up by the council in early 1994 to respond promptly and efficiently to oil spills in the
region.
The major segments in the electronics cluster are data storage, computer systems,
semiconductors, consumer electronics, office automation, passive components, PCBs and
display devices, telecommunications, and contract manufacturing. Under the E2000 program,
strategic partnerships are formed. Examples of high-level partnerships are a S$ 500 million
TECH Semiconductor joint venture by Texas Instruments, EDB, Canon, and Hewlett-
Packard, and a S$ 1 billion Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing’s Fab II expansion
project with Rockwell, Broktree, and Actel for the fabrication of sub-micron ASICs on 8-inch
wafers. Under LIUP, 35 MNCs and large local companies are upgrading and expanding
Singapore’s supporting industry. The construction of regional industrial and technological
parks by Singapore allows MNCs to become regional partners and tap into the expanding
regional markets. Manpower training grants under the Initiatives in New Technologies
Scheme, or INTECH, are awarded to partially offset the cost of training engineers and
technicians for project set up and R & D in Singapore. Under IMP, recruiting and hiring of
overseas professionals are aided by EDB. The Institute of Microelectronics, Center for
Wireless Communications, Magnetics Technology Center, and GINTIC Institute of
Manufacturing are set up to provide collaborative research with industrial partners apart from
research done in universities and polytechnics. MNCs themselves have also extended their
own R & D activities. Examples are Matsushita’s Applied Research Center, Motorola
Electronics’ Advanced Printed Circuit Board Test Laboratory, Hewlett-Packard’s Worldwide
Product Charters, Sony precision Engineering Center, and Siemens Components’ Mixed
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Signal IC Design Center. MNCs are encouraged to set up regional headquarters here so as to
extend their manufacturing activities to management support. Sony International Singapore,
Motorola Electronics, Asia Matsushita Electric, Hewlett-Packard, and SGS-Thomson have
taken up the opportunities.
In summary, the efforts to develop these two clusters are focused on infrastructure
investment, R & D, upgrading of supporting local companies, capability and manpower
development, and regionalization. In almost all programs, the involvement of MNCs is
extensive.
VI. Case Studies of MNCs
We have attempted to paint a broad picture of EDB as an institution that has played a critical
role in attracting foreign investors to Singapore. It is useful now to give a brief report of how
MNCs perceive the role of EDB. For this purpose, we refer to a study commissioned by EDB
Society to look at EDB’s thirty-five year experience. For this study, Edgar H. Schein (1996)
of the MIT Sloan School of Management interviewed a number of firms to obtain their
feedback on doing business in Singapore. We summarize the responses of some of these firms
here.
Mobil
In 1893, Mobil started business in Singapore as the Vacuum Oil Company. EDB contacted
Mobil in 1962 to explore a possibility of investing in petroleum facilities. A year later Mobil
decided to invest S$39 million in a refinery. The reasons given include: Mobil’s need for a
regional center; political instability elsewhere; good site in Jurong; very good tax relief; low-
interest loans; exemption from import duties; and availability of foreign exchange through
EDB pioneer program. The refinery started operation in 1966. Its construction provided many
jobs for a number of years. In 1973, Mobil further invested S$ 150 million to expand its
capacity.
There was not enough local labor to complete a construction project. Foreign workers were
required. EDB helped Mobil to work through various government agencies and the National
Trade Union Congress for foreign workers and extra housing. According to A. V. Liventals,
the local manager of Mobil for much of the 1980s, access to EDB was easy, EDB’s efficiency
was impressive, and EDB worked like a business rather than a bureaucracy.
DuPont Corporation
In 1973, DuPont established a sales office in Singapore for the distribution of explosives. In
1978, Berg Electronics, a division of DuPont, started to explore manufacturing possibility in
Singapore. This project was promoted intensively by EDB. This subsidiary was set up and it
grew over time. DuPont took up additional projects later. In 1991, a Delrin compounding
plant, a regional distribution center, and a Corporate Data Center at the Singapore Science
Park were opened. In 1992, a Lycra polymerization plant was opened. According to Edgar
Woolard, Chairman of DuPont, DuPont wanted a location near the customers of the future
and needed local facilities which were highly efficient, a strong ingredients base, land, staff,
reasonable costs, and a stable customer base. Singapore offered the best mix of resources.
DuPont found that EDB was the most knowledgeable government people with whom they
had done business, EDB kept its promises, and that there were no under-the-table payoffs. It
was emphasized repeatedly that EDB understood what is important for Singapore and for
business. Taking a long-range view, DuPont has explored further the possibilities for research
in Singapore by hiring scholars from India and China.
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Texas Instruments
Texas Instruments (TI) started their integrated circuit assembly in 1969. Their test factory was
constructed and made operational in fifty days, which came to be known as the fifty-day
miracle. The basic drawing for the manufacturing layout was done by an EDB officer who
was TI’s liaison officer. The Mass Rapid Transit was pile driving near the site of and during
the building of a wafer fabrication facility and the vibrations would disturb the fabrication
unit when it was in operation. But EDB managed to hasten the construction work of the Mass
Rapid Transit so that it was completed before the fabrication unit became operational. In
another incident, EDB worked efficiently with JTC to arrange for a plot of land to be leased
to TI, and cleared other administrative requirements, saving TI 4-5 years of time if TI were to
do all the work itself or through a local lawyer.
Hewlett-Packard
Hewlett-Packard (HP) began operations in 1970 with the assembly of core memories. In
1972, HP proposed they manufacture their new mini-calculators for the world market, the
proposal was accepted, and pioneer status was granted. HP continued to invest in various
manufacturing projects, in an integrated circuit design center, an Information Network R & D
Center, and in a joint venture with TI, Canon, and EDB to manufacture advanced
semiconductors. The long-range growth philosophy of HP is well matched with Singapore’s
need to grow technologically.
The case studies extracted from Schein (1996) show that many of the MNCs started labor-
intensive operations in Singapore and over time have upgraded to more technology-intensive
manufacturing and even R & D. They usually have a long-range view of investment. They
also benefited from the coordination and efficient problem solving of the resourceful EDB.
EDB was noted to be very knowledgeable in terms of relevant industries and companies. This
is particularly important. EDB has a network of worldwide offices which gather valuable
information. EDB interacts actively with the various industries to exchange information. An
example is the “think tank breakfast.” The efficiency and the absence of corruption in EDB
also contribute to an attractive investment environment.
Schein (1996, Table 9.1, pp. 154-155) presents a master list of pro-Singapore factors by
MNCs. The factors are grouped into eight categories: geographic location; cultural factors;
government strategies and attitudes; general economic factors; EDB characteristics; land and
facilities; infrastructure; and labor.
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, we argue that the government of Singapore, and EDB in particular, have been
able to achieve success in their export drive for the following reasons. First, Singapore
remains committed to an open liberal policy towards international commerce and capital over
many years, and it has built up a reputation as a reliable host country to foreign investors.
This has the effect of lowering the discount rate that potential foreign investors apply in their
cost-benefit analyses when deciding whether they should to locate in Singapore. The
generally harmonious industrial labor relations in Singapore also work to strengthen that
reputation. Second, by committing itself to act as a one-stop center for foreign investors, EDB
has helped to lower the transaction cost of doing business in Singapore. This factor is fortified
in a generally corruption-free business environment. The three firms we interviewed indicated
that they do not need to make ''extra payments'' to encourage efficiency and reliability in the
bureaucratic process. Third, although the government and EDB have been pro-active in the
functioning of the economy as a whole, they have been responsive to market signals. As we
alluded to earlier, one benefit the government sees in attracting foreign investors to Singapore
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is that they provide a market signal to the government about the sort of manpower training
that is needed in industry. In this way, it avoids the problem of producing large numbers of
graduates who cannot find employment in their field.
EDB is also sensitive to the shifting comparative advantage position of the economy and
through its international network of foreign offices, and seeks to woo increasingly skill-
intensive and knowledge-based industries to Singapore. It also maintains a continuing
dialogue with business leaders in the private sector and therefore can respond quickly to
perceived industry needs. Finally, the government puts emphasis on and devotes substantial
resources to the development of good infrastructure. This translates into cost savings for firms
located in Singapore and is an important factor for the three firms we interviewed. No less
important, a comprehensive and transparent legal infrastructure in Singapore has contributed
to the efficient functioning of the market mechanism and economic development of
Singapore.
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Appendix
This appendix provides a list of legislative acts which have contributed to the economic
development of Singapore.
Employment Act
The Employment Act sets out the basic rights and duties of employers and employees. An
employer or employee may have other rights and duties contained in a contract of service or a
collective agreement, so long as such rights and duties are not contrary to the provisions of
the Employment Act.
Industrial Relations Act
The Industrial Relations Act establishes the rights and duties between employers and their
employees who are, or who can be, represented by trade unions. It is also designed to prevent
and settle trade disputes by collective bargaining, conciliation and arbitration. In reaching a
decision, the Industrial Arbitration Court, which is constituted under the Industrial Relations
Act, will take into consideration not only the interests of the union or workers or employers,
but also those of the community as a whole, as well as Singapore’s economic condition.
Trade Unions Act
The Trade Unions Act provides for the registration and supervision of trade unions. A trade
union of employees can order its members either to stop work completely, as in a strike, or to
reduce their rate of working as in an industrial action. A strike or an industrial action cannot
be ordered by a trade union unless the union has first conducted a secret ballot among its
affected members and the majority supports such action.
Trade Dispute Act
The Trade Dispute Act controls trade disputes and any strikes, lock-outs, and picketings
which may result therefrom.
Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Acts
The Criminal Law (temporary provisions) Act makes temporary provisions for the
maintenance of public order, and the prevention of strikes and lock-outs in essential service.
Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act
This is an act relating to incentives for the establishment of pioneer industries and for
economic expansion generally, by way of providing relief from income tax. The first version
of the act was legislated in 1967. It shall be construed as one and the same as the Income Tax
Act. A number of current incentives under the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from
Income Tax) Act follow:
· Pioneer industries
· Pioneer service companies
· Post-pioneer companies
· Development and expansion incentives
· Expansion of established enterprises
· Expanding service companies
· Production for exports
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· Export of services
· International trade incentives
· Foreign loans for productive equipment
· Royalties, fees and development contributions
· Investment allowances
· Warehousing and servicing incentives
· International consultancy services
· Investments in new technology companies
· Overseas investment and venture capital incentives
· Overseas enterprise incentive
Income Tax Act
The Income Tax Act imposes a tax upon incomes and regulates the collection thereof. The
first version of the act was legislated as an ordinance in 1948. A number of current incentives
under the Income Tax Act follows:
· Various relief for research and development expenditure
· Reduced tax liability for operational and business headquarters
· Exemption of income of approved venture company
· Tax relief for non-resident investors’ income arising from funds managed in
Singapore
· Reduced tax liability for oil trading company
· Reduced tax liability for approved international trading companies
· Reduced tax liability for art and antique dealers
· Exemption of income of Approved International Shipping Enterprises
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Table 1. Rate of unemployment from 1966-97.
Year Percent
1966 8.9
1967 8.1
1968 7.3
1969 6.7
1970 6
1971 4.8
1972 4.7
1973 4.5
1974 4
1975 4.5
1976 4.5
1977 3.9
1978 3.6
1979 3.4
1980 3.5
1981 2.9
1982 2.6
1983 3.2
1984 2.7
1985 4.1
1986 6.5
1987 4.7
1988 3.3
1989 2.2
1990 2
1991 1.9
1992 2.1
1993 2
1994 1.9
1995 1.9
1996 2.1
1997 1.7
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 2. GDP, population, exports, and imports, 1961-96.
Year         GDP         Pop  GDP/Pop     Exports     Imports    Ex/GDP    Im/GDP
        S$m         '000            S$         S$m         S$m
1961 2329.1 1702.4 1368.13 3308.5 3963.3 1.42 1.70
1966 3330.7 1934.4 1721.83 3373.6 4065.7 1.01 1.22
1971 6823.3 2112.9 3229.35 5371.3 8664 0.79 1.27
1976 14575.2 2293.3 6355.56 16265.9 22404.5 1.12 1.54
1981 28369 2443.3 11610.9 44290.8 58248 1.56 2.05
1986 38653.5 2586.2 14946.1 48985.5 55545.4 1.27 1.44
1991 75320.9 2762.7 27263.5 101880 114195 1.35 1.52
1996 132629 3044.3 43566.4 176272 185183 1.33 1.40
Note: Pop = Population; Ex = Exports; Im = Imports.
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore;
Yearbook of Statistics, various years, Singapore.
Table 3. Net investment commitments in manufacturing, 1972-96.
Year Total
S$m
Local
S$m
Foreign
S$m
Share
of Foreign
1972 194.5 38.2 156.3 80%
1976 303.3 42.8 260.5 86%
1981 1928.8 599.1 1329.7 69%
1986 1450 259.4 1190.6 82%
1991 2934 472.9 2461.1 84%
1996 8085.1 2368.9 5716.2 71%
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 4. Industrial stoppages, 1960-91.
Year    Number   Workers Man-days
Lost
1960 45 5939 152006
1961 116 43584 410891
1962 88 6606 164936
1963 47 33001 388219
1964 39 2535 35908
1965 31 3374 45800
1966 14 1288 44762
1967 10 4518 41324
1968 4 172 11447
1969 0 0 8512
1970 5 1749 2514
1971 2 1380 5449
1972 10 3168 18233
1973 5 1312 2295
1974 10 1901 5380
1975 7 1865 4853
1976 4 1576 3193
1977 1 406 1011
1978 0 0 0
1979 0 0 0
1980 0 0 0
1981 0 0 0
1982 0 0 0
1983 0 0 0
1984 0 0 0
1985 0 0 0
1986 1 61 122
1987 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0
1990 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, various years, Singapore.
30
Table 5. 1969 Singapore Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities.
 (used for years 1986, 1991, and 1996 for selected industries)
SSIC Code
311/2 Food A1
313 Beverage A2
321 Textiles & textile manufacturers B1
322 Wearing apparel except footwear B2
351 Industrial chemicals & gases C1
352 Paints, pharmaceutical & other chemical products C2
353/4 Petroleum refineries & petroleum products C3
382 Calculators, refrigerators, air-conditioners & industrial machinery D1
383 Radios, televisions, semi-conductors & other electrical machinery D2
384 Transport equipment & oil rigs D3
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore.
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Table 6. 1978 Singapore Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities.
 (used for years 1986, 1991, and 1996 for selected industries)
SSIC Code
311/2 Food A1
313 Beverage A2
321 Textiles & textile manufactures B1
322 Wearing apparel except footwear B2
351 Industrial chemicals & gases C1
352 Paints, pharmaceutical & other chemical products C2
353/4 Petroleum refineries & petroleum products C3
382 Machinery except electrical & electronic D4
383 Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances & supplies D5
384 Electronic products & components D6
385 Transport equipment D7
386 Instrumentation equipment, photographic & optical goods D8
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore.
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Table 7. 1996 Singapore Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities.
 (used for years 1986, 1991, and 1996 for selected industries)
SSIC Code
15 Food & beverage A3
17 Textiles & textile manufactures B1
18 Wearing apparel except footwear B2
23 Refined petroleum products C4
24 Chemicals & chemical products C5
29 Machinery & equipment D9
30 Electrical machinery & apparatus D10
31 Electronic products & components D6
32 Medical, precision & optical instruments, watches & clocks D11
33 Transport equipment D7
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 8. Workers engaged in industrial production by selected industry, 1961-96.
Code 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
number number number number number number number number
A1 4112 5855 9705 8567 10075
A2 1572 1992 2354 2639 2744
A3 11733 13390 12446
B1 102 1223 8850 11620 7906 2662 3343 1981
B2 583 4917 13389 20673 27870 24812 25915 10705
C1 225 318 1094 1554 2058
C2 829 1556 3027 3484 4291
C3 27 610 2526 3167 3511
C4 3254 3550 3663
C5 7558 10413 13099
D1 1542 1791
D2 1300 1611
D3 1128 3474
D4 6624 15927 23963
D5 6659 13644 16141
D6 11847 35756 69358 68763 122839 128033
D7 18529 24299 28491 17087 30091 35631
D8 1288 7382 5419
D9 23412 29483 33792
D10 11771 16465 16950
D11 5587 9133 9472
Total 26481 51066 140552 207234 281675 246682 358274 365856
Note: Blank means not applicable ; Total = Total manufacturing.
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore; Yearbook of
Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 9. Industrial output by selected industry, 1961-96.
Code 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
S$m S$m S$m S$m S$m S$m S$m S$m
A1 123.4 235.6 577.6 938 1692.5
A2 44.2 56.6 70.1 150.7 327.2
A3 2536.9 2579.9 3355.1
B1 0.7 12.6 128.5 359.9 422.1 239.2 401.7 278.8
B2 4.7 27.7 122.6 406.1 924.7 1241.3 1739.1 811.1
C1 4.3 5.9 50.8 210.1 363.7
C2 13.2 32.6 88.1 311.9 663.4
C3 1.3 263.3 1553.5 6118.8 14453.8
C4 6945.9 11226.5 12198.6
C5 2847.4 5451.4 6970.8
D1 18.6 25.7
D2 17.8 33.4
D3 26.9 64.4
D4 137.8 676.9 2484.2
D5 118.1 531.8 1050.3
D6 278.3 1722.6 5728.5 11182.8 28827.2 62768.8
D7 384.7 1117.6 2223.8 1805.6 4050.4 4667.4
D8 25.6 193.2 290.6
D9 2293.7 4356.7 6422.4
D10 976.2 2113 3291.4
D11 418.2 914.1 1497.4
Total 510.8 1310.8 4699.2 15317.4 36787.1 37258.7 74575 119503
Note: Blank means not applicable ; Total = Total manufacturing.
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore; Yearbook of
Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 10. Remuneration of employees by selected industry, 1961-96.
Code 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
S$m S$m S$m S$m S$m S$m S$m S$m
A1 9.1 13.6 30 51.8 103.4
A2 4.4 7.1 11.1 22.9 40
A3 187 303.6 350.5
B1 0.1 2 19.7 56 68.8 32.9 60.4 47.8
B2 1 5.6 22.2 69.8 179.3 225.5 322 186.2
C1 0.8 2 6.4 14.1 33.4
C2 1.9 3.7 10.7 30 62.4
C3 0.1 5.6 42.2 67.2 114.7
C4 146.5 237.3 293.8
C5 192.7 396.2 673.1
D1 4.8 5.9
D2 4.6 5.6
D3 4.1 15.2
D4 25.8 125.8 323.8
D5 20.8 73.8 154.5
D6 33.5 186.8 577 976 2313.1 3604.9
D7 103.2 223 433.2 338 738.4 1195
D8 4.5 39.2 47.3
D9 402.1 732.9 1160.3
D10 163.7 331.8 555.8
D11 72.5 192.6 282.9
Total 69.2 145.4 503.2 1309.8 2938.1 3769.1 7655.9 11327.1
Note: Blank means not applicable ; Total = Total manufacturing.
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore; Yearbook of
Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 11. Employment, output, and wages by selected industrial sector, 1961-96.
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
Workers, number
A 5684 7847 12059 11206 12819 11733 13390 12446
B 685 6140 22239 32293 35776 27474 29258 12686
C 1081 2484 6647 8205 9860 10812 13963 16762
D 3970 6876 44947 97008 143372 126620 208011 223878
Total 26481 51066 140552 207234 281675 246682 358274 365856
Output, S$m
A 167.6 292.2 647.7 1088.7 2019.7 2536.9 2579.9 3355.1
B 5.4 40.3 251.1 766 1346.8 1480.5 2140.8 1089.9
C 18.8 301.8 1692.4 6640.8 15480.9 9793.3 16677.9 19169.4
D 63.3 123.5 944.5 4242.1 11777.4 16676.5 40261.4 78647.4
Total 510.8 1310.8 4699.2 15317.4 36787.1 37258.7 74575 119503
Wages, S$m
A 13.5 20.7 41.1 74.7 143.4 187 303.6 350.5
B 1.1 7.6 41.9 125.8 248.1 258.4 382.4 234
C 2.8 11.3 59.3 111.3 210.5 339.2 633.5 966.9
D 13.5 26.7 187.8 648.6 1535.8 1952.3 4308.8 6798.9
Total 69.2 145.4 503.2 1309.8 2938.1 3769.1 7655.9 11327.1
Notes: A = A1+ A2 + A3;
B = B1 + B2;
C = C1 + C2 + C3 + C4 + C5;
D = D1 + D2 + D3 + D4 + D5 + D6 + D7 + D8 + D9 + D10 + D11;
Values for A's, B's, C's are taken from Tables 8, 9, 10;
Total = Total manufacturing.
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore; Yearbook of
Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 12. Shares of employment, output, and wages by selected industrial sector, 1961-96.
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
Industrial share of workers
A 21.5% 15.4% 8.6% 5.4% 4.6% 4.8% 3.7% 3.4%
B 2.6% 12.0% 15.8% 15.6% 12.7% 11.1% 8.2% 3.5%
C 4.1% 4.9% 4.7% 4.0% 3.5% 4.4% 3.9% 4.6%
D 15.0% 13.5% 32.0% 46.8% 50.9% 51.3% 58.1% 61.2%
Industrial share of output
A 32.8% 22.3% 13.8% 7.1% 5.5% 6.8% 3.5% 2.8%
B 1.1% 3.1% 5.3% 5.0% 3.7% 4.0% 2.9% 0.9%
C 3.7% 23.0% 36.0% 43.4% 42.1% 26.3% 22.4% 16.0%
D 12.4% 9.4% 20.1% 27.7% 32.0% 44.8% 54.0% 65.8%
Industrial share of wages
A 19.5% 14.2% 8.2% 5.7% 4.9% 5.0% 4.0% 3.1%
B 1.6% 5.2% 8.3% 9.6% 8.4% 6.9% 5.0% 2.1%
C 4.0% 7.8% 11.8% 8.5% 7.2% 9.0% 8.3% 8.5%
D 19.5% 18.4% 37.3% 49.5% 52.3% 51.8% 56.3% 60.0%
Notes: A = A1+ A2 + A3;
B = B1 + B2;
C = C1 + C2 + C3 + C4 + C5;
D = D1 + D2 + D3 + D4 + D5 + D6 + D7 + D8 + D9 + D10 + D11;
Values for A's, B's, C's are taken from Tables 8, 9, 10;
Total = Total manufacturing.
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore; Yearbook of
Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 13. Output and wage per worker by selected industrial sector, 1961-96.
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
Output per worker, S$
A 29486 37237 53711 97153 157555 216219 192674 269573
B 7883 6564 11291 23720 37645 53887 73170 85914
C 17391 121498 254611 809360 1570071 905781 1194435 1143622
D 15945 17961 21014 43729 82146 131705 193554 351296
Total 19289 25669 33434 73914 130601 151039 208151 326639
Wage per worker, S$
A 2375 2638 3408 6666 11187 15938 22674 28162
B 1606 1238 1884 3896 6935 9405 13070 18446
C 2590 4549 8921 13565 21349 31373 45370 57684
D 3401 3883 4178 6686 10712 15419 20714 30369
Total 2613 2847 3580 6320 10431 15279 21369 30961
Output per worker in sector divided by output per worker in total manufacturing
A 1.53 1.45 1.61 1.31 1.21 1.43 0.93 0.83
B 0.41 0.26 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.26
C 0.90 4.73 7.62 10.95 12.02 6.00 5.74 3.50
D 0.83 0.70 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.87 0.93 1.08
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wage per worker in sector divided by wage per worker in total manufacturing
A 0.91 0.93 0.95 1.05 1.07 1.04 1.06 0.91
B 0.61 0.43 0.53 0.62 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.60
C 0.99 1.60 2.49 2.15 2.05 2.05 2.12 1.86
D 1.30 1.36 1.17 1.06 1.03 1.01 0.97 0.98
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: A = A1+ A2 + A3;
B = B1 + B2;
C = C1 + C2 + C3 + C4 + C5;
D = D1 + D2 + D3 + D4 + D5 + D6 + D7 + D8 + D9 + D10 + D11;
Values for A's, B's, C's are taken from Tables 8, 9, 10;
Total = Total manufacturing.
Source: Economic and Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore; Yearbook of
Statistics, various years, Singapore.
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Table 14. Returns on equity investment: local and foreign, 1980-94.
1980 1985 1990 1994
Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign
% % % % % % % %
Food 13.3 5.7 5 5.4 10 19.1 8.9 14.8
Textile -1.7 4.2 -14 -10.9 6.9 0.3 -13.5 -11.6
Wood -5.8 -2.9 -31.7 -20 11.7 -16.9 18.2 -2.6
Paper 17.6 7.6 6.8 26.9 22.2 45.7 5.6 63.1
Chemical 12.2 20.8 -4.1 20.1 10.2 30.2 17.6 24.6
Petrol 0.1 26.9 6.4 6.8 0.5 26.7 6.6 17
Rubber 10.8 4.5 -1.1 3.7 9.3 10.4 29.2 36.9
Metals 19 48.5 2.6 10.7 9.5 -2 -0.7 86.3
Fab Metal 1.7 15.2 -4.6 4.9 5.4 13.9 7.6 15.7
Mach 12.2 28.7 -10.8 8.6 9.9 12.4 8.7 10.7
Electr -1.7 29.5 5.4 23.2 2.7 22 19.7 19.7
Transp 23.2 35 -18.8 23 13.8 10.7 6.6 10.1
Instrum 10.7 4.8 -1.5 31.4 -12.7 13 -1.7 23.2
Others 16.4 17.3 -11.4 -2.4 8.6 5.6 9.3 22.5
Total 14.2 24.5 -5.2 14.6 10.6 21.6 10.2 19.9
Note: Food = Food,
Beverages & Tobacco;
Textile = Textiles, Wearing Apparel & Leather;
Wood = Wood & Wood Products including Furniture;
Paper = Paper & Paper Products, Printing & Publishing;
Chemical = Chemical & Chemical Products;
Petrol = Petroleum & Petroleum Products;
Rubber = Rubber & Plastic Products;
Metals = Basic Metals;
Fab Metal = Fabricated Metal Products;
Mach = Machinery;
Electr = Electronic Products & Components;
Transp = Transport Equipment;
Instrum = Instrumentation, Photographic & Optical Goods;
Total = Total Manufacturing.
Source: Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore, 1980-1989, Singapore; Foreign Equity
Investment in Singapore, 1987-1994, Singapore.
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Table 15. Pioneer manufacturing establishments, 1961-96.
Year Number of
Establishments
Number of
workers
     Output
S$m
Share of Output
1961 7 241 36 0.9% 7.0%
1966 165 11102 490 21.7% 37.4%
1971 291 66124 2403 47.0% 51.1%
1976 293 87405 8921 42.2% 58.2%
1981 432 116907 22857 41.5% 62.1%
1986 427 115951 22351 47.0% 60.0%
1991 432 170584 46077 47.6% 61.8%
1996 397 170780 82418 46.7% 69.0%
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore, various years.
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Table 16. EDB Loans and Equity Participation, 1961-68.
Year       Loans
Disbursed
   Equity Participation
Amt. Paid
    S$'000     S$'000
1961 117 125
1962 2057 1160
1963 7178 1862
1964 9274 4238
1965 17443 6264
1966 8433 5636
1967 10791 645
1968 11031 8550
Source: Economic Development Board Annual Report, various years, Singapore..
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Table 17. Industrial distribution of DBS-assisted companies and financial commitments,
1968-73, and 1976.
      Textile       Wood       Petrol        Metal       Electr  Tran Eqp  Transport    Fin Insti
31/12/68
number 9 6 4 2 3 3 1
$'000 17625 6943 6836 213 16770 1068 3739
% 16.5 6.5 6.4 0.2 15.7 1 3.5
31/12/69
number 16 9 1 5 7 10 6 1
$'000 22488 16668 58999 8202 40479 16932 2117 8466
% 8.5 6.3 22.3 3.1 15.3 6.4 0.8 3.2
31/12/70
number 19 10 1 7 9 13 10 3
$'000 37828 31317 59000 14012 53721 33553 6379 10514
% 11.1 9.2 17.4 4.1 15.8 9.9 1.9 3.1
31/12/71
number 17 13 1 9 13 15 12 4
$'000 36693 39581 74490 25232 62486 45879 51357 12014
% 7.6 8.2 15.4 5.2 12.9 9.5 10.6 2.5
31/12/72
number 15 16 2 13 16 17 16 9
$'000 32922 39184 84342 49560 65284 64324 95041 45200
% 5 5.9 12.8 7.5 9.9 9.7 14.4 6.8
31/12/73
number 17 25 2 14 16 20 26 13
$'000 36102 49787 88886 73932 60990 177178 176836 69669
% 3.5 4.9 8.7 7.2 6 17.3 17.3 6.8
31/12/76
number 17 27 2 25 24 28 41 26
$'000 42138 62011 107719 90644 88826 507210 286050 216849
% 2.2 3.2 5.5 4.6 4.6 25.9 14.6 11.1
Notes: Textile = Textile, Texile Products & Footwear;
Wood = Wood & Paper Products;
Petrol = Petroleum & Petroleum Products;
Metal = Metal & Metal Products;
Electr = Electrical machinery & Electronic Products;
Tran Eqp = Transport Equipment;
Transport = Transport & Transport-related Services
Fin Insti = Financial Institutions;
% is percentage out of total industrial financial commitments;
Blank means not applicable.
Source: Development Bank of Singapore Annual Report, various years, Singapore.
Table 18. Industrial distribution of DBS Group's loans and advances, 1993-97.
   (including bills financing)
31/12/97 31/12/96 31/12/95 31/12/94 31/12/93
Industrial
Sector
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Manufactur
ing
14.3 12.8 14.3 15.4 17.7
Building &
Construction
19.3 18.5 17.2 18.5 18.9
General
Commerce
7.5 7.7 8.6 8.7 7.6
Transport, Storage &
Communications
8.5 7.9 8 8 4.7
Financial Institutions & Holding
Companies
16.9 17.2 18.1 16.2 17.4
Professionals & Private
Individuals
25.2 27.8 25.4 24.2 22.1
Others 8.3 8.1 8.4 9 11.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Total
(S$m)
40134.7 31012.7 26171.8 22055.3 18257.4
Source: Development Bank of Singapore Annual Report, various years, Singapore.
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Table 19. Loan programs of EDB, 1996-97.
1997 1996Loan
Programs         S$m         S$m
Local Enterprise
Finance Scheme
850.3
Regionalization
Finance Scheme
29.5 37.1
Capital Assistance
Scheme
200.2 47.4
Automation Leasing
Scheme
173.4 127.9
Entrepreneur
Development Fund
7.1
Total 410.1 1062.7
Note: Blank means not applicable.
Source: Economic Development Board Annual Report, 1997, Singapore.
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Table 20. Principal statistics of manufacturing by capital structure, 1996.
          Capital Structure
wholly loc. >.5 local <.5 local wholly for.         Total
Establishment, number 2928 290 207 643 4068
Worker, number 130624 40032 23965 173434 368055
Output, S$m 19139.7 9427.4 8732.9 82569 119867
Materials, S$m 10151.2 4463.1 6094.1 55317.8 76026.2
Remuneration, S$m 3535.2 1416.1 794.9 5506.6 11252.8
Operating Cost, S$m 3947.2 2092.2 1086.9 8502.5 15628.7
Value Added, S$m 5041.4 2872.1 1551.9 18748.7 28214.1
Sales, S$m 19209.5 9739.8 8713.6 82494.7 120158
Direct Exports, S$m 5323.2 4879.2 5702.9 57058.7 72964
Net Fixed Assets, S$m 6495 4906 1866.3 15831.9 29099.2
Shares of Costs:
Materials 57.6% 56.0% 76.4% 79.8% 73.9%
Remuneration 20.0% 17.8% 10.0% 7.9% 10.9%
Operating Cost 22.4% 26.2% 13.6% 12.3% 15.2%
Share of Direct Exports
in Sales
27.7% 50.1% 65.4% 69.2% 60.7%
Notes: Wholly loc. = Wholly local-owned;
>.5 loc. = Majority local-owned, but not wholly local-owned;
<.5 loc. = Majority foreign-owned, but not wholly foreign-owned;
Wholly for. = Wholly foreign-owned.
Source: Report on the Census of Industrial Production 1996, Singapore.
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Table 21. Principal statistics of selected industries, 1996.
Industrial Code
23 24 29 31 33
Establishment, number 18 195 565 238 307
Worker, number 3531 13621 35145 128455 34892
Output, S$m 13746.5 7163.1 6452.2 60912.8 4828
Materials, S$m 11283.5 3495.1 3187 42379.4 1378.1
Remuneration, S$m 301.8 676.2 1183.7 3522.5 1164.9
Operating Cost, S$m 839.2 937 1511.5 5861.3 1794.5
Value Added, S$m 1623.8 2731.1 1753.7 12672.2 1655.4
Sales, S$m 13586.5 7099.2 6555.3 60948.2 5047.1
Direct Exports, S$m 4603.9 5287.9 3667.6 46969.8 2555.5
Net Fixed Assets, S$m 4635.7 3078.8 1781.1 8296.3 2031.6
Share of Costs:
Materials 90.8% 68.4% 54.2% 81.9% 31.8%
Remuneration 2.4% 13.2% 20.1% 6.8% 26.9%
Operating Cost 6.8% 18.3% 25.7% 11.3% 41.4%
Share of Direct Exports
in Sales
33.9% 74.5% 55.9% 77.1% 50.6%
Note: Code 23: Refined Petroleum Products;
Code 24: Chemicals & Chemical Products;
Code 29: Machinery & Equipment;
Code 31: Electronic Products & Components;
Code 33: Transport Equipment.
Source: Report on the Census of Industrial Production 1996, Singapore.
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